• We examine a practical housing market in the presence of price controls.
Introduction
We study a practical housing market where houses are rented to tenants.
1 Each tenant has valuations on houses and is interested in renting at most one house. The landlord has a reservation rent for her houses and is not willing to let the house to any tenant if the rent falls short of her reservation rent. A government authority imposes a ceiling rent on every house (e.g., a legislated rent control). The central issue is how to efficiently allocate the houses among the tenants through a system of rents that satisfy both the reservation and ceiling rent constraints. Because price controls may fail the Walrasian equilibrium, the classical solution to the problem is to consider constrained equilibrium; see e.g., Andersson and Svensson (2014) , Drèze (1975 ), or van der Laan (1980 . A major drawback of the constrained equilibrium is its lack of Pareto efficiency (Böhm and Müller, 1977; Herings and Konovalov, 2009) . Therefore, we adopt the more natural solution of a core allocation. There are several major advantages. First, every core allocation is Pareto efficient and stable against any coalition deviation. Second, the core allocation is conceptually simpler, more intuitive and straightforward as it consists of only an assignment of items and its supporting price vector but does not use any rationing scheme. Third, the core allocation as a prime strategic equilibrium is widely used in general exchange economies and game theoretic models; see, e.g., Scarf (1967) , Shapley and Scarf (1974) , and Predtetchinski and Herings (2004) .
Our main result shows that the ascending auction of Talman and Yang (2008) can somewhat surprisingly always find a core allocation in finite steps. As a result, we provide an economically meaningful and effective solution to this class of practical regulated market problems.
The assignment model under price control
A seller wishes to sell n heterogeneous indivisible items, indexed by 1, . . . , n, to m bidders indexed by 1, . . . , m. The set N = {0, 1, . . . , n} represents all items including a dummy item 0, and the set M = {1, . . . , m} contains all bidders. The dummy item 0 has no value and can be assigned to any number of bidders. Ev-
The seller has a reservation price p j ∈ Z + for each item j ∈ N below which the item will not be sold. A central planner imposes price controls, i.e., each item j ∈ N has a ceiling price p j ∈ Z + above which the item is not permitted to sell. By convention 0 ≤ p j < p j for each j ∈ N and p 0 = p 0 = 0. A price vector p ∈ R N + indicates a price for every item, and the set of admissible prices is given by
When there are no price controls, i.e., when p j = +∞ for every j = 1, . . . , n, the model reduces to the classical assignment market studied by, e.g., Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) and Shapley and Shubik (1971) .
A feasible assignment π assigns every bidder i ∈ M an item π (i) such that no item in N\{0} is assigned to more than one bidder. Note that a feasible assignment may assign the dummy item to several bidders and a real item j ̸ = 0 may not be assigned to any bidder. An item j ̸ = 0 is unassigned at π if there is no bidder i such that π(i) = j. Let U(π ) denote the set of all unassigned items at π . A feasible allocation (π , p) consists of a feasible assignment π and an admissible price vector p such that p j = p j for every unassigned
A Walrasian equilibrium is a feasible assignment π and a price
for every unassigned item j ∈ U(π ). Price control may fail the Walrasian equilibrium since the equilibrium prices may not be admissible. To handle the problem, we will explore the notion of core.
there does not exist a coalition S of bidders besides the seller and
The following theorem establishes the existence of a core allocation, generalizing the well-known existence theorem for the assignment market by Koopmans and Beckmann (1957) and Shapley and Shubik (1971) . It will be proved via an ascending auction in the next section. 
Results
To present the auction we need some basic concepts. For a set of real items T ⊆ N\{0}, and a vector p ∈ R N + , define the lower inverse
e., the set of bidders who demand only items in T at p. 
, if the price of every item in T is strictly greater than its reservation price and the number of bidders who demand at least one item in T is strictly less than the number of items in T . Talman and Yang (2008) proposed the following ascending auction for the assignment model under price control that finds a constrained equilibrium.
The ascending auction
Step 1: The auctioneer announces the set N of items, the reservation price vector p and ceiling prices p. Set the iteration 
Go to
Step 2.
Step = ∅, the auction stops. Otherwise, set t := t + 1 and return to Step 2.
If there is no price control, the above auction reduces to that of Demange et al. (1986) . To prove the main result, we need to invoke two known results. Proof. There is no underdemanded set at p 
Since T is a subset of O at p t , it follows from Lemma 3.1 that The next theorem establishes that the allocation found by the ascending auction is always in the core, thus resulting in a constructive proof for Theorem 2.2.
